The incentives to participate in and the stability of climate coalitions
Start date
04.06.2009
04.06.2009
End date
04.06.2009
04.06.2009
Time
12:00 - 13:00
12:00 - 13:00
Location
Milan
Milan
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta 63
20123 Milan
h. 12.00 Seminar
h 13.00 Light Lunch
Francesca Polatti, francesca.polatti@feem.it
The purpose of this paper is to undertake a game-theoretic analysis of the following three issues: i) the incentives for main GHG emitting countries to participate in an international climate policy agreement, i.e. in a “climate coalition”; ii) the stability of such climate coalitions; iii) the potential for improving this stability through international financial transfers and arrangements. This analysis is carried out using the general equilibrium model WITCH.
Attachments
1.
The incentives to participate in and the stability of climate coalitions
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