United We Vote
Date
01.01.2006
01.01.2006
Authors
Jon X. Eguia
JEL Code
D72,D71
D72,D71
Keywords:
Voting bloc,Coalition formation,Voting rule
Voting bloc,Coalition formation,Voting rule
Publisher
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor
Carlo Carraro
Carlo Carraro
This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the bloc. We also determine whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of the bloc, and we find the different optimal internal voting rules that aggregate preferences within the coalition.